Why Fulbright Won on "National Commitments", P. 2

Plaque For The Moon Landing

Here Men First Set Foot Outside The Earth On Their Way To The Far Stars. They Speak of Peace But Wherever They Go They Bring War. The Rockets On Which They Arrived Were Developed To Carry Instant Death And Can Within A Few Minutes Turn Their Green Planet Into Another Lifeless Moon. Their Destructive Ingenuity Knows No Limits And Their Wanton Pollution No Restraint. Let The Rest Of The Universe Beware.

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Why SALT Spells Fraud

The folly of competition in arms was recognized by philosophers in the Eighteenth Century and statesmen in the Nineteenth. The first disarmament conference was held at the Hague in 1899. Except for the period of the two World Wars, there has hardly been a year in which disarmament negotiations of some kind have not been going on. These have become a ritual, and almost a comedy, punctuating the pauses and fresh starts of the arms race. The military machines and their allies have learned to turn them into an elaborate kind of game, designed to befuddle public opinion into believing that something was being done about the ever growing expense and danger.

A Cover For The Arms Race

Not only the State Department but the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed sub-divisions skilled in "arms control," that is, talk about arms control. This gamesmanship has been perfected to the point where it may actually be used to cover up a new spiral in the arms race, or indeed even to sell the public on the need for new weapons and higher expenditures. This is the only safe, if cynical, perspective from which to view the Nixon Administration's preparations for new talks on strategic weapons. The men named to direct these talks and the negotiating positions being mapped out in advance are not calculated to restrain or reduce the arms race but to move it forward into the higher and more dangerous levels represented by the ABM and the MIRV. The SALT—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—will prove a fraud.

Some apparent motion toward arms talks was essential to the Nixon Administration on the eve of the Senate battle over ABM. This was a political necessity to convince wavering Senators that the ABM is just a bargaining card to use in negotiations, and to keep alive the hope that this dangerous and expensive new development will be made unnecessary by joint agreement. But if you look closely you will see that nowhere has the Nixon Administration explicitly said it would forego an ABM if the Russians did likewise. On the contrary, you will see that the Nixon Administration is not prepared to negotiate *whether* there will be an ABM but only *how much* of one.

This was implicit in a hint dropped by the President March 14 in the original press conference announcing the ABM when he was asked whether he would "be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?" Nixon replied that "the arms talks that at least preliminarily have been discussed, *do not involve limitation or reduction.* [Italics added]. They involve only freezing where we are." Then Nixon went on to say that he "would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat" and added, "So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor." Moscow must have been startled to hear Nixon speaking for it.

Where There Is No Vision

Indecisive, weak and tricky, with neither the statesman's vision nor the politician's finesse—this is how Nixon shapes up. Like Johnson, he talks of fighting inflation but is unwilling to gain revenue by stopping up tax loopholes or by imposing the excess profits taxes usual in wartime; he fights only to continue the regressive 10 percent surtax which falls heaviest on the lower income brackets. In the Knowles affair, he showed himself a weakling; a storm could have been avoided if he had said "no" sooner. Unlike Johnson, Nixon does not seem to grasp at all the gravity of the racial crisis. On voting rights and school guidelines, his equivocations encourage Southern resistance and intensify black disillusion. That terrible separation into two nations of which the Kerner commission warned has been deepened by Nixon's transparent "Southern strategy". It is a tragedy at a time like this to have a nullity in the White House.

The full meaning of Nixon's remarks begins to be spelled out by a pamphlet "Safeguard: What Are The True Answers?" sent out recently to editors all over the country by Nixon's Director of Communications Herbert G. Klein. The answer to the question, "How would Safeguard affect prospects for arms control?", after spelling out various possibilities, concludes by saying—

> **However, those parts of the Safeguard program designed for defense against China, small countries with a strategic delivery capability or accidental or unauthorized attacks from any source would not be affected by arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, nor do we expect the Soviet Union to forego deployments designed for similar purposes.**

This means the only part of the Safeguard system open in negotiation is that small part designed specifically to protect our Minuteman bases. This leaves out the major part of the system, the Spartans and the computer-radars which go with them and the Sprints to protect the computer-radars.

(Continued on Page Two)

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(Continued from Page One)

Indeed from the rest of the reply to this question it is not even clear just how much of our Minuteman defenses would be negotiable. It says "If the Soviet Union slows down or stops its deployment of the large payload SS-9 missile or if the likelihood that these missiles will be armed with accurate multiple warheads is materially reduced, we can readily *limit* that part of the Safeguard program which is designed to defend our land-based missiles." The italics are ours, to emphasize what is here offered is limitation of planned deployment and not reduction.

A Slick One-Sided Bargain

But what if the development of the Soviet SS-9 is an answer to our MIRV, as it seems to be? This does not say that we would give up our MIRV if they did not develop theirs. It says we would limit our ABM missiles if they slow down or stop the deployment of the SS-9 and "materially reduce" the "likelihood"—whatever these terms mean—that they will be armed with "accurate multiple warheads." So we are proposing to bargain our ABMs against their MRVs instead of negotiating ABMs against ABMs and MIRVs against MIRVs to put a stop to both monstrous developments. (MRVs are multiple warheads; MIRVs are multiple *and* independently targeted).

This slick stance becomes clearer in the next sentence, "Even more favorable reductions in the Soviet offensive and defensive threat could be matched by further restraints in our ABM deployment." There is no indication of any readiness to put our own MRVs and MIRVs on the table, nor even to go beyond "further restraints" in our ABM deployment.

The Administration's negotiating position on MRVs and MIRVs is less clear. But there are clues in an article Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air Force, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* last April. Brown is one of six men picked for the negotiating team in the SALT talks. Brown is regarded as the most dovish of the six, and Brown is not much of a dove as we shall see. The others are Major Gen. Royal B. Allison, former arms control specialist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Paul H. Nitze, a Dean Acheson hard-liner from way back, Deputy Secretary of Defense under Johnson, more recently picked by the new Pentagon team as "consultant" to prepare for the new talks; Llewellyn Thompson, former Ambassador to Moscow; and two standard model State Department types who were once assistants to John Foster Dulles—Gerard C. Smith, now head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Philip J. Farley, deputy assistant Secretary of State for political-military affairs.

At first glance Brown's article seems to be in favor of arms control but reading it closely one can see that it is for arms control *after* and not before the construction of anti-ballistic missiles and the deployment of multiple warheads on each side. If this is to be the position of the Nixon Administration, then the effect of new arms talks—even if successful—would be *to initiate rather than prevent a new spiral in the arms race.*

Insofar as ABM is concerned, Brown says a limit of 100 would be enough protection against "small accidental strikes" but 1,000 would be "much more satisfactory . . . against third country attacks." He admits that 1,000 "might begin to threaten the stability of the U.S.-Soviet deterrence, since it might give the attacker the capacity to eliminate most of the retaliatory weapons that would survive a first strike employing improved MIRV technology." Brown then suggests a limit of several hundred launchers for city defense "as opposed to missile site defense" for which he gives no concrete number. So this envisages city defense *as well as* missile site ABMs,

Latest Test Of Our Tiger-Ish Allies

Col. Lien [South Vietnamese Commander in the area which includes Benhet] said North Vietnamese had taken the "bait" and were in the process of being "smashed" . . . In Saigon today, however, South Vietnamese military spokesmen reported South Vietnamese forces sweeping the area around Benhet reported no contacts with the enemy in several days. Asked to explain the apparent discrepancy, one South Vietnamese colonel said, "That's Vietnam." Col. Lien, he added, "is a real tiger."

—*J. P. Sterba from Saigon* New York Times *July 2.*

The siege of Benhet was not lifted by American airpower, American artillery or the belated appearance of the regular South Vietnamese infantry. It was lifted by the North Vietnamese troops that had besieged the outpost in the first place . . . The South Vietnamese despite the massive U.S. logistical and firepower support behaved miserably . . . Col. Lien claimed at least 3600 enemy troops died in his "trap". Most allied intelligence estimates place the total enemy troops at about 3500.

—*Bentley Orrick from Saigon* Baltimore Sun, *July 8.*

Why the Senate Passed 70-16 Fulbright's "National Commitments" Resolution

"This Resolution . . . signals an end to Congressional acquiescence to unauthorized commitments of American men and financial resources abroad." —*Cook (R.Ky.)*

"In one of the hearings last year or the year before, the then Secretary of State Rusk made the argument, and it was very offensive to me . . . that, having supported the foreign aid bill, and having given a great deal of aid to South Vietnam, we had created a kind of Constitutional climate that gave authority to our Government, to what we were doing. That really turned me on. If I had dreamed that, by supporting foreign aid, I was giving him or any other administration authority to intervene with 500,000 men, I would have cut my throat." —*Fulbright (D.Ark)*

"If the Executive can independently decide when to deploy America's Armed Forces, it . . . has the final say in determining how a large proportion of our resources will be expended. But resource allocation is Congress' most important function . . . Without this power, Congress would be nothing more than an ornament, whose only purpose would be to give automatic approval to the decisions of an all powerful Executive." —*Tydings, (D.Md.)*

"Secretary . . . Rusk made the now-famous statement that—'No would-be aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, Congressional declaration, or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression.' . . . this statement comes perilously close to casting us in the role of policeman of the world—a role which we have neither the manpower nor the materiel resources to fulfill." —*Stennis (D.Miss.)*

"With the exception of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we are called upon to ratify trivia . . . With respect to things that matter and which affect the destiny of the Nation, we frequently leave them up to unilateral executive decision." —*Eagleton (D.Mo.)*

"The Roman Caesars did not spring full blown from the head of Zeus. Subtly and insidiously, they stole their powers away from an unsuspecting Senate. . . . Senators of the United States may still enjoy their ancient freedom to debate and legislate, but through our own neglect, we have come to deal increasingly more with the form than with the substance of power. —*Church (D.Idaho)*

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though not as many as 1,000 altogether. An agreement on these lines would thus open and vastly enlarge this new ABM sector of the arms race.

Arms Control a la Rube Goldberg

Insofar as MIRV is concerned, Brown at first seems to be against its deployment. "Clearly," he writes, "an agreement to ban the deployment of MIRVs would be desirable to forestall erosion of the capability to deter." But this soon begins to blur. For Brown goes on to say, "But the agreement *should* allow multiple re-entry vehicles that are *not* capable of being individually guided." The italics are Brown's. But then Brown admits by implication that once we move into multiple warheads it is difficult if not impossible to tell by aerial surveillance how many there are atop each missile and whether they are independently guided or not. As Brown says, "Unfortunately a check on deployment of different types of payload clearly requires on-site inspection of a very obtrusive kind." A "very obtrusive kind" is presumably the kind we, as well as the Russians, would object to.

The one clear answer to this problem is to negotiate an agreement banning both MRVs and MIRVs while there is still time to prevent this new and destabilizing development. Brown suggests instead a murky compromise. "It is possible," he suggests, "that even without on-site inspection we can tell enough about each other's missiles to obtain reasonable assurance." He says, "This is so because the probable number of warheads per missile is proportionate to the payload of the missile, and payload, in turn, is directly related to the gross volume, which we may be able to determine unilaterally," i.e. by aerial reconnaissance.*

"Thus," Brown goes on, "a ceiling on numbers and sizes of missiles could also limit MIRVs to a number less than that needed for an effective first strike, *and yet permit enough re-entry vehicles to penetrate missile defenses*—as required for deterrence." [Italics added]. If we need multiple warheads to overcome ABM, why not negotiate an agreement to deploy neither?

Brown's further suggestions admit that once ABMs and MRVs are allowed, policing such an agreement would be difficult. He says we would not only need an agreement to limit the number of ABMs and missiles but "to ban completely any mobile land-based missiles, since they would make it easier to conceal illicit increases in a missile force." Once the horse was stolen, any number of locks would be needed for the stable door. "A subsequent agreement, Brown continues, "should then be worked out to limit the size of missiles and thus prevent the *unlimited growth* [my italics—IFS] of the MIRV threat through development of larger and larger missiles." But even this is not enough because as Brown writes—

All deterrence systems tend to obsolesce. Thus, the increasing accuracy and miniaturization of missile warheads reduce the survivability of missiles in silos; improved anti-submarine warfare techniques have the same effect upon Polaris; improved FOBS or submarine-launched missiles lessen the effectiveness of the bomber; and new ABM or anti-aircraft techniques might seriously affect weapons penetration—all without an increase in the quantity of weapons.

This opens the prospect of an endless arms race in quality if not quantity once ABM and MIRV are accepted. To meet the menace of perpetual improvement, Brown adds another rickety device to his Rube Golbergian arms control structure. "In order to attain a lasting treaty," he writes, "we might need an understanding on exactly what sort of improvements would or would not be allowed." This in turn would "also require some form of relatively simple on-site inspection to ensure compliance." The inspectors would have no easy time

(Continued on Page Four)

*** For a startling revelation of how much we can now learn by aerial reconnaissance see Jeremy J. Stone's chapter, "Can The Communists Deceive Us?" in the symposium on the ABM edited by Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Weisner.**

No Sooner Said Than Done

"Taken together, the military-industrial team, which protects our national interest against foreign enemies, constitutes at the same time a vital national resource that contributes on an ever-increasing scale to solutions for many of our domestic ills."

—U.S. Air Force Association annual policy statement, Air Force and Space Digest, *May, 1969.*

"Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has named a ranking general in Vietnam to become director of the Pentagon's Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations Office. He is Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, commander of the 24th Corps in Vietnam. The Civil Disturbance Center operates as a military command post for directing and overseeing the movement of troops around the country during city riots."

—A. P. in the Washington Star, *May 29.*

"The war against organized crime now is getting help from the Pentagon. Charles H. Rogovin, head of the Justice Department's law enforcement assistance administration, said two intelligence gathering divisions of the Defense Dept. are providing technical assistance for an 'automated organized crime intelligence system.' "

—A. P. Same Paper, Same Day.

Why Bother the Mafia, When You Can Chase Student Subversives Instead?

"Undercover police investigations in Illinois are at an all-time high. In the Chicago area alone, more than 1,000 men from the FBI and various other federal, state, county, and city agencies are working on super-secret assignment. 'Our growing concern about subversives and militants, with their talk of armed revolution, has brought us a temporary shift in emphasis away from the organized crime problem, said Illinois State Police Supt. James T. McGuire. 'I've never seen anything like the intensity of the current investigations in all my years in law enforcement,' McGuire said.

"The shift in emphasis was evidenced this week when dozens of undercover agents 'monitored' the seventh annual convention here of the leftist Students for a Democratic Society. Deputy Chicago Police Supt. John Mulchrone, the department's resident expert in intelligence matters, said he had 'upwards of 500 men' doing undercover work. The new shift against subversives also was evidenced in an April speech by Mulchrone's top aide, Capt. Thomas J. Lyons, at a meeting of 600 police intelligence experts at Palm Springs, Cal. Lyons described the telephone interchange of information between police departments when a suspected subversive travels . . . Undercover agents use a variety of investigative techniques. These include disguises, wiretapping, infiltration and around-the-clock surveillance. Frequently they use 'dummy' businesses operating from rented storefronts, and assign policemen as drivers of trucks from non-existent television repair companies or pizza parlors. Mulchrone said he often hires civilian men and women as informers and investigators. 'We get people who've become disillusioned . . .

—Edmund J. Rooney in the Chicago Daily News, *June 21.*

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(Continued from Page Three)

of it. For Brown would design the treaty limits "to control the first strike threat," but he says they "should not inhibit the countermeasures which must be taken against gradual improvements in the other side's forces or against illicit improvements." Finally Brown admits that "the problem is complicated by the fine line between first-strike and second-strike capabilities." No wonder we are already being told cheerfully in backgrounders from the Pentagon that the negotiations might take years! How achieve stability once you embark—as Brown would have us embark—on two such destabilizing developments as ABM and MIRV?

Freezing U.S. Superiority

There is a hidden ploy in the recesses of this negotiating position. An agreement to limit the number and size of missiles would freeze U.S. superiority. We are ahead of the Russians in miniaturization and accuracy of warheads as well as in the development of MRV and MIRV. The MRVs in clusters of three are already deployed in Polaris A3 missiles, possibly even in Minuteman III, though the latter is not certain. We have already budgeted $2 billion for the coming fiscal year to deploy Poseidon and Minuteman III, both MIRVed. The Russians have only tested cluster MRVs. We began to deploy MRVs in Polaris as far back as 1966. Thus the Russians, in accepting an agreement of this kind, would have to settle for a position of inferiority in which the U.S. might achieve a first strike capacity without violating any of the various agreements set forth by Brown. After all we are putting 10 or more warheads in each Polaris submarine with Poseidon and 3 or more in each Minuteman without any significant increase in the size of the missile and no increase in their numbers. These MIRVs will soon increase our capacity to the point where the Soviets would have reason to fear a first strike.

Such corkscrew negotiating positions, almost certain to ensure failure and thus excuse a further surge in the arms race, suits the solidly Goldwaterite chain of command which will oversee the talks for the Pentagon. The new Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, is Dr. Yuan-li Wu, originally a refugee from Communist China, more recently a scholar at that cold war citadel, the Hoover Institute of War and Revolution at Stanford. Goldwater welcomed the appointment in a Senate speech June 5 and attended Dr. Wu's swearing in, where the Senator found himself among old friends. Dr. Wu's superior is Dr. G. Warren Nutter, the new Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. The ISA is the Pentagon's own little State Department and Dr. Nutter has been described (by Karl Hess, Goldwater's famous ghost writer) as "the anchor man" of Goldwater's "think tank team" in 1964. And Nutter's superior, of course, is Secretary of Defense Laird, who presided over the writing of Goldwater's platform in 1964, and whose inflammatory campaign for the ABM is hardly calculated to make the Russians feel they are dealing with an Administration soberly and sincerely anxious for arms talks and detente.

This sour impression will not be corrected by the political complexion of the General Advisory Committee Nixon has just appointed to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The most prominent appointee is Dean Rusk, whom Nixon greatly admires; no Secretary of State ever cared less about disarmament. The most disquieting appointee is that same William J. Casey, the lawyer-public relations man who is chairman of the Citizens Committee for Peace With Security which was organized out of the White House basement and has already distinguished itself by a highly dubious poll showing 84%—why not 99%?—of the American people in favor of the ABM. There is not one strong voice for disarmament on the advisory committee; the doves are weak, the hawks are strong. This should be no surprise. A President who wanted Senator Jackson as Secretary of Defense and settled for Laird, and whose most influential mentor seems to be Major General Strom Thurmond, is not likely to negotiate an end to the arms race.

From the Spider to the Fly?

"[Harold] Kaplan (U.S. delegation spokesman in Paris) was asked to explain how the disposition of allied forces in the South can be a 'military housekeeping' problem for the allies and simultaneously a door-opening move toward peace. If the recall of 25,000 American forces is only a 'replacement' of them by South Vietnamese forces (terminology that Saigon has insisted upon in place of 'withdrawal') Kaplan was asked, will the total remain unchanged? 'It is perfectly true that as our forces are replaced by the South Vietnamese and other allied forces there, the total strength on the allied side does not change,' Kaplan replied. 'But the fact remains,' he said, 'that the withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces should, if the other side is disposed to go down the road, constitute an opening, a possible invitation . . .'"

—Murray Marder in the Washington Post, *June 27.*

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